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WHEN IS STATE LAW APPLIED TO FEDERAL
ACQUISITIONS OF REAL PROPERTY
Lawrence Berger*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Clearfield Trust case' established that in federal
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. This article is adapted
from a study done by the author for the United States Department
of Agriculture.
1 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In that
case, a salary check drawn on the United States and made out and
sent to one Darner, a WPA employee, somehow never reached the
latter. Someone forged and cashed the check with the J.C. Penney
Co., which endorsed it to defendant Clearfield Trust Co. Clearfield
in turn endorsed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and
guaranteed prior endorsements. The United States did not notify
Clearfield of the forgery until about eight months after the above
transactions, though an agent of the United States had information
that the check was missing a few days after those events. The United
States sued Clearfield in federal court on its endorsement and Clear-
field defended under Pennsylvania decisions holding that a drawee
cannot recover from an endorser where he unreasonably delays in
giving the endorser notice of the forgery. The question for decision,
thus, was whether Erie required the federal court to apply state com-
mercial law, or whether the federal court was free to fashion its own
common law in determining the rights of the parties. The district
court held itself bound by state law. The court of appeals reversed.
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the court of appeals,
gave a very explicit answer to this question:
' We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule .of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ... does not apply to this action. The
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which
it issues are governed by federal rather than local law. When the
United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising
a constitutional function or power. . . . The authority to issue the
check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United
States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or
of any other state.... The duties imposed upon the United States
and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their
roots in the same federal sources. . . . In absence of an applicable
Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards....
"In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally
selected state law. . . . But reasons which may make state law at
times the appropriate federal rule are singularly inappropriate here.
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast
scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will
commonly occur in several states. The application of state law, even
without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the
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question cases, 2 the rights and liabilities of the United States nor-
mally must be governed by a federally fashioned common law,
there has followed a plethora of cases involving many different
areas in which that doctrine has been applied. For example, in the
area of federal government contracts, it was held that the federal
courts would not be bound by state decisional law, but would
fashion their own rules concerning governmental liability.3 A
similar rule was held to apply in a tort case involving the govern-
rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It
would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transac-
tions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The
desirability of a uniform rule is plain." Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, supra at 366-67.
2 The use of the term "federal question" to describe the Clearfield type
of case is to a degree inaccurate but is a necessary shorthand. The
Erie-Clearfield dichotomy is commonly thought to be between the
diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdictions of the fed-
eral courts. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942). But
Professor Moore, citing many cases in a good discussion of the subject,
takes a more refined view of the problem: "It is true that in the
bulk of diversity cases the substantive issues are non-federal and
hence state substantive law is determinative; and, conversely, in the
bulk of cases where jurisdiction is predicated upon some other basis
federal law is determinative. But this is not always true. For ex-
ample, a case that is in the federal court solely on the basis of diver-
sity may turn upon a defense predicated upon the Constitution or a
federal statute; and state law certainly does not rule the defense.
On the other hand, a case may be in the federal court on some jur-
isdictional basis other than diversity and yet the cause of action or
determinative issue may be a state claim or issue upon which state
law speaks with finality." 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.30513], at
3054-55 (2d ed. 1961). See also IA id. f 0.324.
Thus, the question is not what is the source of the court's juris-
diction, but what is the nature of the issue for the court's determi-
nation. If the claim or defense "arises out of" state law, state law
should govern. Likewise, if the claim or defense "arises out of" fed-
eral law, federal law should normally govern. But this, too, we shall
see, is an oversimplification, because the scope of the application of
state law will vary according to source of the court's jurisdiction. See
discussion accompanying note 7 infra. See also in the general area
of choice of law in nondiversity litigation: 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8 (1960); Hill, State Procedural
Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HAiv. L. REV. 66 (1955);
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal
Common Law, 53 CoLumv. L. REV. 991 (1953); Rules of Decision in
Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960).
3 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United
States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944).
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ment's right to recover for the loss of services and hospitalization
of a United States soldier negligently injured by defendant. 4 And
it was held that the question of the existence of a lien of the
United States and its priority over state-created liens was a matter
for federal determination.5
Of course, this does not mean that, in federal question cases
involving the United States as a party, state law is never appli-
cable. As Mr. Justice Rutledge said in United States v. Standard
Oil Co.:
It is true, of course, that in many situations, and apart from
any supposed influence of the Erie decision, rights, interests and
legal relations of the United States are determined by application
of state law, where Congress has not acted specifically. 'In our
choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected
state law.' Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. at 367.
The Government, for instance, may place itself in a position
where its rights necessarily are determinable by state law, as
when it purchases real estate from one whose title is invalid by
that law in relation to another's claim. Cf. United States v. Fox,
94 U.S. 315. In other situations it may fairly be taken that Con-
gress has consented to application of state law, when acting par-
tially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure
to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so gov-
erned. And in still others state law may furnish convenient solu-
tions in no way inconsistent with adequate protection of the fed-
eral interest.6
The above opinion seems to state that the extent and mode of
application of state law called for in these federal question cases
may be entirely different from those cases where the Erie doc-
trine is involved. Where Erie applies, the federal court is entirely
bound by what the state law is. Indeed, the court is powerless to
declare what the federal law is, because there is no federal law
governing at all. However, in the federal question area, this is
arguably not at all true. It is the federal court that is declaring
what the law is and it may in its discretion refer to state law for
the resolution of some but not all issues in the case.7 The issue of
4 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
5 United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); United States v. Acri,
348 U.S. 211 (1955).
6 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947). In addition, of course, Congress may
deliberately and expressly subject the rights of the United States to
application of state law. This was done in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which provides for adjudication of certain tort claims against the
United States "in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission complained of occurred." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1958).
7 The distinction is strongly argued and documented in Mishkin, The
Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
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when the court should exercise its discretion in one way or the
other has been the subject of a substantial amount of litigation
in many different areas.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the cases prior and
subsequent to Clearfield involving the question of what law the
United States courts apply when the federal sovereign is acquiring
real property. These cases, which necessarily involve almost ex-
clusively federal condemnation matters, indicate that both the
Clearfield doctrine and the limitation thereon amplified in United
States v. Standard Oil are applicable; i.e., that both federal and
state rules may come into play. An attempt will be made herein
to reconcile these cases and formulate some criteria for a proper
resolution of the issues involved. Before this is undertaken, how-
ever, it will be necessary to describe very briefly the history of
federal condemnations in order that the problem may be more
completely understood.
II. THE BACKGROUND8
For almost 100 years after its founding, it was the practice of
the United States to resort to state courts and obtain the consent of
the state legislature when it wanted to condemn lands within a
state. However, in 1875, in Kohl v. United States,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that federal condemnations could
properly be had in federal courts and without the consent of the
state legislatures. From that time forward, most such condem-
nations were actually had in federal court, though Congress in in-
dividual condemnations continued the former practice to a de-
gree.' 0
Choice of National and State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
797, 802-06 (1957).
A completely contrary position is argued in Rules of Decision in
Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1448-49 (1960). There it is
stated that the Rules of Decision Act compelling the application of
state law in diversity cases under Erie also is fully applicable to non-
diversity cases. The argument is sound on the basis of logic and
early history, but the courts do not presently even discuss the act in
their opinions on these problems. They are apparently assuming it
is not applicable. The modem case law does back up the assertion
of a dichotomy made by Professor Yishkin.
8 See 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1515
(1958); 6 NiCHOLs, EINENT DomAiN §§ 27.1, 27.2 (3d ed. 1953); 1
NICHOLs, EimNENT DOMAIN §§ 1.24, 2.13 (3d ed. 1950).
9 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
10 See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
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Kohl left unanswered the question of what law should be
applied in those proceedings. With respect to procedure, the
Conformity Act of 187211 was probably applicable to make federal
cases conform to the state practice existing at the time of suit.12
But the matter was made explicit in 1888 by a special statute
which specifically authorized the federal courts to handle federal
condemnations and required conformity to local practice "as near
as may be."'13 In addition, scores of special statutes prescribed
different procedures for different types of condemnation pro-
ceedings. 14 The result was a patchwork of over 250 different pro-
cedures in the federal courts. This situation obtained until Rule
71 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
August 1, 1951. The basic effect of the latter was to prescribe a
uniform procedure under the federal rules for all condemnation
matters in the federal courts. Rule 71 (a) is still in effect today.
III. THE BASIC CASE LAW
The governing statute, enacted in 1888, provided in part as
follows:
The practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceeding in
causes arising under the provisions of this act shall conform, as
near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule
of the court to the contrary notwithstanding.15
There were several limitations engrafted by the courts upon
the requirement of conformity, some readily deducible from the
wording of the statute and some not. Conformity was not re-
quired: (1) where it would necessarily involve an unintended
waiver of federal sovereign immunity, e.g., in the imposition of
costs against the government; 16 (2) where it would be contrary
to an express enactment of Congress and therefore "necessarily
and unwisely encumber the administration of justice"' 7 (thus, a
state law requiring two separate juries to determine the issues in
11 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197.
12 Carlisle v. Cooper, 64 Fed. 472 (2d Cir. 1894).
I8 Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357 (formerly 40 U.S.C.
§ 258).
14 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1515.
15 See note 13 supra.
16 United States v. Knowles Estate, 58 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1932); Carlisle
v. Cooper, 64 Fed. 472 (2d Cir. 1894); United States v. Wade, 40 F.2d
745 (E.D. Idaho 1926).
17 Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 514 (1896).
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a condemnation case would not apply, because it would be contrary
to acts of Congress governing jury trials of cases at law 18); and (3)
when the issue is one of substantive rather than procedural law.
This result would be obvious from the fact that on its face the
Conformity Act applied only to "practice, pleadings, forms and
modes of proceeding." Likewise, a similar situation would prevail
under Rule 71 (a), which deals with procedure. Purportedly on the
basis of this substance-procedure distinction, federal law was
held to govern such matters as the measure of compensation, 19
the procedure for determination of whether the taking was neces-
sary,20 the time when interest runs on a judgment in condem-
nation,21 the presence or absence of a requirement that the gov-
ernment attempt to purchase by negotiation as a prerequisite to
condemnation, 22 the right to recover for loss of possession pending
condemnation,23 and the territorial jurisdiction of the federal
courts' process.24 In addition, and for the same reason, such mat-
ters as the extent of the estate taken, 25 admissibility of evidence
relating to damages, 26 and the question of whether indeed there
was a taking at all 27 were for federal determination. However,
it should be noted that, just as in other areas, the distinction be-
18 This was the holding of Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499 (1896).
It should be noted that a similar standard was used by the courts
with respect to the general Conformity Act of 1872. Indianapolis &
St. L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876). And see WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 61 (1963).
19 United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); United States v. Alcorn, 80 F.2d
487 (9th Cir. 1935); Town of Nahant v. United States, 136 Fed. 273(1st Cir. 1905); United States v. 2902 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 595(D. Wyo. 1943); United States v. 2715.98 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp.
683 (W.D. Wash. 1942).
20 In re Condemnations for Improvement, 266 Fed. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1920);
United States v. O'Neill, 198 Fed. 677 (D. Colo. 1912).
21 Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); United States v. Maho-
wald, 209 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v. Certain Lands,
129 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1942). It should be noted that in the first case
the court chose to follow state law after stating it was not bound
to do so.
22 In re Secretary of Treasury of United States, 45 Fed. 396 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1891); United States v. 80 Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 315 (E.D.
Ill. 1939); United States v. Crary, 1 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1932).
23 Kanakanui v. United States, 244 Fed. 923 (9th Cir. 1917).
24 Sewchulis v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 233 Fed. 422 (2d Cir. 1916).
25 United States v. Kansas City, Kan., 159 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1946).
26 United States v. 3595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal.
1962).
27 Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
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tween substance and procedure tended to break down, and the
cases, on analysis, seemed to foreshadow the "outcome test" of the
Guaranty Trust case.28 Thus, it was said that federal law would
govern an apparently procedural matter, if the question went to
the landowners' "fundamental right. ' 29 On the other hand, as we
shall see below in detail, state law was held to govern substantive
matters where that choice seemed appropriate.
A. THE SUBSTANTIVE-PROcEDURAL DIsTINCTIoN FURTHER CONSIDERED
Though there was some surface appeal in using the substan-
tive-procedural distinction to solve all the problems under the
Conformity Act, it became apparent that the indiscriminate use of
such a standard would lead to unsound results. There was found
to be a broad area for the appropriate application of state law to
substantive issues. This consisted mainly of those matters which
are traditionally viewed as involving rights arising out of and
normally enforced by state law. For example, as between two
private parties, the issue of who owns Blackacre in its normal
context is one solved by application of state common law and
statutes. That issue also often arises in a federal condemnation
proceeding. If the conflict is between parties A and B as to who
owns the condemned property and is therefore entitled to the
award, this should be resolved in the federal court by reference to
the body of state law which governs the issue. This is exactly
what the federal courts have done. Thus, where the United States
wants to condemn a fee simple, and the determination of who
presently owns the property depends upon construction of a will,
the state property law will be referred to,30 and the issue of who
among competing parties was the lessee of an oil and gas lease
and thus entitled to compensation will be referred to state law,
even to the extent of staying a federal proceeding to await the
outcome of a pending state action.31 Likewise, where the United
States is condemning leasehold interests, the duration of the
28 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This, of course, was
the case that held in effect that the state "substantive" law which
the federal courts had to apply under Erie included state "procedural"
law, if the failure to use the latter would lead to a substantially dif-
ferent result than that which would be reached if the case were actu-
ally tried in the state court.
29 United States v. O'Neill, 198 Fed. 677, 682 (D. Colo. 1912). The pro-
cedural matter was a state requirement that a commission determine
the taking is necessary before the condemnation is valid.
30 United States v. 0.20 Acre of Land, 71 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
31 United States v. Adamant Co., 197 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1952).
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tenant's interest must necessarily be measured by the property law
of the state.32 In addition, the question of whether the landlord
or the tenant owned improvements erected upon the property by
the tenant is a matter for state law.33 And it has even been held
that state law will govern whether a condemnation ipso facto
terminates a lessee's interest so as to make it noncompensable.3 4
If state law should govern the question of whether A or B
owns the property, it logically follows that it should also deter-
mine whether A or B or nobody at all has a lien on the property.3 5
Accordingly, it has been held that the question of whether there is
a municipal lien for taxes upon property to be federally con-
demned is a question of state statutory interpretation, the obliga-
tion of the federal government being to pay, in total, a sum equal
to the value of the land as if owned unfettered by one person.3 6
The federal courts have also looked to state law for definition
of an interest where the nature of that interest may determine
whether it is compensable or not. For example, it has been held
that the issue of whether a building is personalty which is not
subject to condemnation, or realty which is so subject, is a ques-
tion for state law.3 7 And where the fee in realty was owned by
one person and the mineral rights by another, whether the latter
was a fee simple or mere incorporeal interest was a matter for
state law, the measure of compensation being for federal law.3 8
Likewise, where land burdened with a water assessment payable
to a nonprofit water company is condemned, the nature of the
water company's interest will ordinarily be defined by looking
to the state law, again the measure of compensation being for
federal law.89
32 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States
v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
33 United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
34 United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
35 Unless, of course, the lien is federally created.
36 United States v. 25.936 Acres of Land, 153 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1946);
United States v. 232.68 Acres of Land, 57 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Tenn.
1944). See also United States v. Certain Space, 167 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.
Ill. 1958).
37 United States v. 19.86 Acres of Land, 141 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1944).
38 United States v. 4.533 Acres of Land, 208 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal.
1962).
39 Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960).
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B. CASES APPLYIMG FEDRAL LAW TO STATE RELATED ISSUES
On the other hand, it is not in every case involving rights ap-
parently springing from state law that the courts will apply it.
There is a strong line of cases that seems to engraft broad limita-
tions upon the rule. This was first made explicit by the United
States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson.4 0
That case involved issues in the measure of damages and the
definition of private property in federal condemnation. The claim
of the condemnee was that it also had the power of eminent do-
main under state law and that the lands to be condemned would
have been assembled by it into a larger, more valuable tract, and
that this should be considered in the award. With respect to that
contention, the Court said:
The right of the United States to exercise the power of
eminent domain is 'complete in itself' and 'can neither be en-
larged nor diminished by a State.' . .. Though the meaning of
'property' as used.., in the Fifth Amendment is a federal ques-
tion, it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.
Yet when we look to local law in the present case, we find no
indication that for purposes of condemnation proceedings insti-
tuted by North Carolina the value of the lands in question would
be increased by reason of respondent's privilege to use the power
of eminent domain. So far as constitutional compulsions are con-
cerned, it is plain, as we have noted, that that factor need not be
included in case the state were the condemnor. Moreover, the
result in the present case is not different if we assume with the
District Court ... that respondent's 'prior right' under North
Carolina law 'constituted a valuable right, which is destroyed by
this condemnation proceeding.' It does not follow that that 'prior
right' was 'private property' within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment which was taken by the United States.41
The Court then went on to examine as a matter of federal law
whether the unexercised power of eminent domain was itself
"private property" which could not be taken without payment of
compensation. The Court decided on its own reasoning that it
was not such property. Thus, it left clearly to federal determina-
tion a matter which, viewed from the perspective of cases hereto-
fore discussed, was for the state; viz., the definition of property.
It had indicated that, though that question was for federal deter-
mination, normally state law would be referred to. But the Court,
after first looking to state law, said it was irrelevant to the final
determination and never really indicated why the normal rule was
not here to be followed. Powelson, thus, left unanswered the
40 319 U.S. 266 (1942).
41 Id. at 279-80.
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question of when federal law and when state law should be ap-
plied to the definition of property.4 2
Much was clarified a few years later, however, when the
Eighth Circuit was presented with a related problem in Nebraska
v. United States. 43 In that case, the United States was seeking to
condemn lands owned by the State of Nebraska and received by it
for its common school system. The State had leased some of the
acreage to private individuals. The trial court had instructed the
jury to deduct the fair market value of the leasehold interests
from the value of the land to arrive at an award for the State.
The State had contended that under pre-existing Nebraska case
law, the State holds title to the lands as a trust for the schools
and may not authorize an alienation of the fee unless it receives
the full value of the lands involved. In affirming the trial court,
the court of appeals rejected the application of state law to this
situation.
What constitutes property and what is just compensation for
it in a condemnation by the United States are not questions of
state law but of federal law. . . . Of course, the term 'property'
in such a situation normally will be given the same content as in
state law .... This does not mean, however, that every local
idiosyncracy or artificiality in a state's concepts, or the incidents
thereof, necessarily will be accepted. Thus, the United States
could hardly be expected to recognize for condemnation purposes
any such local artificiality in property concept as that a leasehold
is not in any sense a dilution of fee rights but in point of law
and regardless of fact adds body and value to the property.4 4
This case might simply be viewed as reaffirming the principle
discussed above, that in federal condemnation the measure of com-
pensation is a federal question. The court actually rested its
opinion on that point. However, it also indicated it was dealing
with a special rule of property which was unacceptable in federal
court because it was "artificial." Certainly a rule that a state can
not alienate certain lands which it does not fully own without
receiving their full value as though unencumbered could be
viewed either as a rule of property or as a measure of compen-
sation. What label is attached to the problem, however, would
seem to be unimportant. It is the court's approach that is signifi-
cant and that was to look to federal law when federal interests are
apparently jeopardized by state law, no matter into what legal
pigeonhole the problem is conceptually placed.
42 It does buttress, however, Professor Mishkin's view of the Erie-
Clearfield dichotomy. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
43 164 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1947).
44 Id. at 867-68.
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Another case involving the application of the same principle is
United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Champaign Coun-
ty.45 That was a case involving the federal condemnation of a
lessee's interest in Wherry housing, in which the land was owned by
the United States but leased for seventy-five years to defendants.
The lessee's interest was mortgaged to a third party. The trial court
had held that Illinois law applied to the definition of the property
interest the government could condemn, that there was no such in-
terest as a leasehold subject to a mortgage in Illinois, because in
Illinois a mortgagee has only a lien and not title; and further, that
the entire leasehold, including the mortgagee's interest must be
condemned with the condemnation award subject to the lien of the
mortgage. The practical effect of this holding was to give de-
fendants 6% interest on the award from the date of taking until
the date of payment of the judgment, a period of fourteen months.
Since the interest the defendants would have to pay to the mort-
gagee was only 4%, this amounted to a profit of 2% on the
amount of the award, thus netting defendants an extra $148,000.
The government had contended below that federal law should
apply; that under federal law there was such an interest as a
leasehold subject to a mortgage; and that the award to defendants
should, therefore, be the value of the leasehold less the amount of
the mortgage. The view contended for by the government would
have resulted in saving the government the $148,000 profit above
mentioned. In reversing the district court and holding that
federal law does apply, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
tinguished another earlier condemnation case saying:
The district court reasoned that its holding was dictated be-
cause Illinois is a lien theory state and state law governs, citing
Swanson v. United States, 9 Cir., 1946, 156 F.2d 442, 447, 170A.L.R. 258, certiorari denied, Spokane Portland Cement Co. v.
Swanson, 329 U.S. 800, 67 S.Ct. 492, 91 L.Ed. 684, for the prop-
osition that the mortgagee's rights are determined by state law.
We think the district court's reliance on Swanson is misplaced.
In that case, the dispute was between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee as to their respective rights, and the court properly
held that the extent of the title or right of one condemnee as
opposed to another condemnee is determined by local law when
such a dispute arises in the course of federal condemnation pro-
ceedings. No direct federal interest was involved. In the case
before us here we have an entirely different question presented.
There is no dispute here between defendants and the mortgagees,
the latter not even being parties to this proceeding. The sole
issue is whether the United States has the power to condemn only
45 271 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1959).
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the interests of defendants and to exclude the rights of others not
made parties. 46
The court then went on to discuss the Supreme Court opinion in
United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, discussed infra, and con-
cluded by saying:
Condemnation being an essential governmental function and
Congress not having chosen to make state law applicable to the
definition of property interests condemned by the government, it
follows that the United States is not limited to condemnation in
terms known to the state, but rather may define such interests in
terms of federal law.47
It is when United States v. Nebraska and the Champaign
County case are read in connection with Powelson that the sig-
nificance of the latter finally begins to become clear. The reasons
for decision more specifically articulated in United States v. Ne-
braska are fully applicable to Powelson. These cases all arguably
involved the definition of a property right; all were concerned
with the possible application of an "artificial" or atypical state
rule; 48 all might have resulted in a higher award than fair market
value as federally defined, if state law were applied, and, of course,
all three resulted in the application of a federal rule to avoid just
that result.
It should be noted that this approach involves federal con-
sideration of the substantive content of the state law with regard
to the point at issue and federal rejection of that state law if it
reaches an atypical result. The reason for this is clear. "Since
the issue's outcome bears some relationship to a federal program,
no rule may be applied which would not be wholly in accord
with that program."49 Thus, since the application of state law is
discretionary, properly, its effect upon the federal program must
be considered to determine whether it would not frustrate that
program.
It is not only where there is an artificial state rule involving
greater federal liability that federal law has been applied, how-
ever. The case of John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey5" is in
point. There the United States had condemned a term of years in
a hotel owned by the condemnee and mortgaged to John Hancock.
46 Id. at 383.
47 Id. at 384.
48 Though Powelson really dealt with a hypothetical state rule.
49 Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797, 805-06 (1957).
50 147 F.2d 762 (1st Cir. 1945).
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The condemnee had gone into reorganization pursuant to Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, after having amortized $22,000 of the
$345,000 mortgage. The issue for decision was whether the rental
payments owed by the federal government under its condemned
leasehold were to be paid in full to the mortgagee or only to the
extent of the payment provided for by the mortgage itself. The
court decided that, under the federal statutes involved,51 this was
a matter not for state but for federal law, saying: ". . . Massa-
chusetts law does not control the distribution of the condemnation
deposit as between mortgagor and mortgagee, though such state
law does define the extent of the mortgagee's rights in the real
estate by way of security at the date of taking.152 The court then
went on to hold the mortgagee entitled to take only up to the
yearly amount provided for in the mortgage.
A year later, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar prob-
lem in Swanson v. United States.53 In that case, the 340 acre
tract to be condemned was part of a 3000 acre tract under mort-
gage. At the time of taking, the mortgage had been foreclosed
and the mortgagee had already bought in at foreclosure. However,
under the law of the State of Washington, the mortgagor still had
a right to redeem after foreclosure and this right still had six
months to run at the time of taking. In fact, the land was never
redeemed by the mortgagors. The issue for the court was to de-
termine how the award in condemnation should be distributed.
The mortgagors contended they were entitled to the entire fund,
while the mortgagees claimed an amount sufficient to satisfy their
mortgage. The trial court held for the mortgagees and awarded
the balance in excess of the principal amount of the mortgage to
the mortgagor. On appeal the court was faced with two problems:
(1) What are the property rights of mortgagor and mortgagee
after foreclosure but before the period for redemption has run?
(2) Considering these property rights, how should the award be
distributed? The court held that state law governs the first prob-
lem, but federal law the second. It followed Washington law,
which held the mortgagor can still be the owner after foreclosure,
but determined the distribution on its own authority. The court
held that the mortgagees were entitled only to the principal
amount of the mortgage still unpaid and that the value of the
51 "The court shall have power to make such orders in respect of
encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments, insurance, and other
charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable." 40 U.S.C. § 258(a)
(1959).
52 147 F.2d at 766.
58 156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1946).
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noncondemned portion of the tract should be deducted from said
principal and any deficiency paid to the mortgagee, the balance
going to the mortgagor.
In some ways it is more difficult to justify the Swanson - John
Hancock rule than it is Powelson and United States v. Nebraska.
The latter involve the obvious federal interest that the Govern-
ment not overpay in condemnation. But in Swanson, as well as
in John Hancock, the dispute was not over the total federal liabil-
ity, but over how a conceded sum should be distributed. The ar-
gument would run that if state law is referred to, to determine the
respective interests of the claimants, that approach as to distribu-
tion among those claimants should also be controlling. Such an
argument, it is submitted, is based upon the premise that state law
prima facie applies to these matters. Aside from the fact that the
Clearfield case clearly rejects that premise, there was an additional
reason not to apply state law. There was here a specific statutory
injunction upon the courts to make such distribution "as shall be
just and equitable."' 54 Clearly, Congress, which has plenary power
to determine what law should be applied to its programs, contem-
plated that the determination of "just and equitable" be made
by the court deciding the case. The court so held.
C. THE LATEST SUPREiE COURT CASE
No discussion of this area would be complete without com-
menting on the latest United States Supreme Court case, United
States v. 93.970 Acres of Land.55 In that case, a lease of an air-
field by the United States to respondent reserved in the Govern-
ment a power of revocation in the event of a national emergency.
The preamble to the lease recited that, because of the strategic
value of the property, the Government considered it essential to
retain it in a standby status for aviation. In August, 1954, it was
decided to use the field as a missile site and notice of revocation
was sent. In addition, a condemnation proceeding was begun in
the event the power of revocation was held to be ineffectual, be-
cause the preamble to the lease seemed to limit the power to a case
where the Government wanted the site back as an airfield. The
court below held that, by bringing condemnation, the Government
had elected to abandon its prior revocation, and, on this basis, the
Government should pay compensation to the lessee for taking
away its airfield. In dealing with the issue of whether the state
54 See note 51 supra. On the same point, see United States v. Certain
Lands, 129 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1942).
5s 360 U.S. 328 (1959).
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doctrine that the United States had elected its remedy applies,
the Court said:
Respondents argue, however, that election of remedies is part
of the law of Illinois and that Illinois law applies here. We can-
not agree with this view. Condemnation involves essential gov-
ernmental functions. See Kohl v. United States .... We have
often held that where essential interests of the Federal Govern-
ment are concerned, federal law rules unless Congress chooses to
make state laws applicable. It is apparent that no such choice
has been made here.56
The Court went on to hold that the lease properly construed
allowed the Government to revoke in this situation and that the
United States was not barred from doing so by any doctrine that
it had elected the remedy of condemnation. It should be noted
that, in this property litigation, the Court cited the Clearfield Trust
case for the proposition that where essential interests of the
federal government are concerned, federal law must govern. Al-
though this case might be rationalized merely on the basis that
the doctrine of election of remedies is a procedural matter which
would be for the federal courts anyway, the reach of the Supreme
Court opinion is much broader than just that. In fact, the Court
never mentioned the substance-procedure approach at all. The
case is further evidence of the Court's general predisposition in
the federal question area to apply federal law wherever the
"essential interests" of the national government are concerned.
These essential interests are involved in condemnation where ap-
plication of state law will either unduly increase the amount of
the award or, as in this case, require condemnation where under
federal law no condemnation is necessary.
D. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO THE CASES
Are these cases refusing to apply state law to matters ordinar-
ily arising from such law sound? What should be the criteria to
determine whether to apply state law? Of course, there is no
formula to guarantee an "ideal" solution. It is submitted that at
least the following issues weighing and counterbalancing one an-
other must be thrown onto the scales:
(1) Has Congress expressly decided the issue of which law
applies? If it has, all other considerations become irrelevant.
There is no doubt of Congress' power to refer matters to state law
in the federal question area if it so chooses.57 This approach sat-
56 Id. at 332.
57 Ibid. And see City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
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isfactorily explains both the John Hancock8 and the Swanson59
cases, though in those cases the choice of federal law was more
implied than express.
(2) Would the state law, if applied, contravene a specific fed-
eral statute? If it would, then clearly the court ought not in its
discretion apply the state law.60
(3) Would such law frustrate Congress' purpose in enacting
the federal program under consideration? Here again such law
ought not be applied. Under this category would come such
cases as Powelson6l and Nebraska v. United States.6 2 The appli-
cation of an atypical property rule would in those cases have re-
sulted in greater federal liability and to that extent frustrated a
congressional program to provide only "just" compensation to the
condemnees.
(4) Is uniformity of result across the country desirable with
respect to this particular issue?68 If it is, then a federal rule may
be appropriate. Such an approach assumes, of course, that a fed-
eral rule tends to promote uniformity. This is questionable in
view of the fact that the Supreme Court is unlikely to involve it-
self in such issues as these and the courts of appeal may reach
inconsistent results. Nevertheless, the uniformity approach prob-
ably can be of help. For example, uniformity of substantive re-
sult in the several states might be desirable with respect to the
measure of compensation. The fact that lands of the same value
are located in different states ought not to mean disparate com-
pensations to their respective owners. On the other hand, if the
issue is who owns the condemned property, that determination
ought not to differ whether the tribunal is state or federal. Thus,
uniformity within the state may become a deciding factor.
IV. CONCLUSION
As in other areas involving the federal question jurisdiction,
the question of when federal or state law applies to governmental
acquisitions of property is a problem where "simple generaliza-
tions are not possible."6 4 In this narrow area, however, certain
58 See note 47 supra.
59 See note 50 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
61 See note 40 supra.
62 See note 43 supra.
63 On this issue, see Mishkin, supra note 49, at 813.
64 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.323[22] (2d ed. 1961).
COMMENTS
principles may be noted. First, as in the entire federal question
area, the court here is not compelled in the Erie sense to apply
state law. As Justice Jackson said in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.6 5 in connection with another problem:
"In some cases it [the court] may see fit for special reasons to give
the law of a particular state highly persuasive or even controlling
effect, but in the last analysis its decision turns upon the law of
the United States, not that of any state."66
In the area of procedure, federal law presently governs. Gen-
eralizations about substantive law are more difficult to sustain.
Certain areas, such as the measure of compensation, are held to be
matters of exclusive federal domain. But in many areas, the
federal courts normally have looked to the states for a ready-
made body of law to resolve those private law issues which are
deemed to arise out of state law. These have tended to cluster
around the following questions: As between contending parties,
who owns the condemned property? What is the duration and
extent of the owner's interest? Who has, and what is the extent
of, the lien upon the property? What is the nature of the property
interest which is being condemned? Nevertheless, the federal
courts do not inflexibly apply state law to such issues. Where
the application of an atypical state rule will result in an award
in excess of the fair value of the property, the federal courts will
fashion their own rules. Likewise, the federal courts have tended
to make their own rules with respect to the details of the distribu-
tion of awards between different claimants because of the federal
statute broadly giving them such authority.
65 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
66 Id. at 471.
